Although DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) technology helps prevent spoofing of websites, none of the top e-commerce companies or banking and financial services companies have deployed it fully.
In contrast, two-thirds of US government agencies are using DNSSEC, although some of the agencies are signing their domains incorrectly.
I imagine that in the US in 1963 there were similar stories about the unpopularity of a change required to make delivery of physical messages more reliable. It was called the Zone Improvement Plan - and these days we routinely put ZIP codes on snail mail addresses without grumbling. Need to get over that hump with DNSSEC - and then use the freed-up energy to push BGP and SSL Certificate Authority security improvements up the next hill.
Having implemented DNSSEC for a few domains, I found out first hand that it is very easy to "mess up" and render a domain non resolvable. Even some notable .gov sites (like for example fbi.gov) fell victim to badly configured DNSSEC in the past. On the other hand, attacks that involve DNS spoofing are rare and not considered a sufficient risk compared to the risk of downtime due to badly configured DNSSEC signatures.
This may however change as more commercial DNS providers will offer DNSSEC as a service and as popular DNS servers like BIND make configuring DNSSEC easier.